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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 BRIAN DONLEY, Individually and
13 on behalf of all others similarly
14 situated,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT,
18 INC., MICHAEL RAPINO, and JOE
19 BERCHTOLD,

20 Defendants.
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No. 2:23-cv-6343-KK (ASx)

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
FINAL APPROVAL OF
SETTLEMENT AND PLAN OF
ALLOCATION, AND
CERTIFICATION OF
SETTLEMENT CLASS**

CLASS ACTION

Date: August 28, 2025

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Courtroom: 3

Judge: Hon. Kenly Kiya Kato

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1 Lead Plaintiffs Brian Donley and Gene Gress (“Plaintiffs”) submit this
2 memorandum in support of their Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement and Plan
3 of Allocation, and Certification of the Settlement Class.¹

4 **I. INTRODUCTION**

5 Plaintiffs and Defendants Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (“Live Nation” or the
6 “Company”), Michael Rapino, and Joe Berchtold (“Defendants,” and together with
7 Plaintiffs, the “Parties”) have reached a \$20,000,000 all cash, non-reversionary
8 settlement of this securities class action (“Settlement”). As described below and in the
9 Joint Declaration, the Settlement is an excellent result for the Settlement Class,
10 providing a significant and certain recovery in a case that presented numerous litigation
11 risks, including difficulty in proving complex claims mirroring antitrust violations,
12 obtaining class certification, and difficulty in proving loss causation and damages. In
13 fact, the Settlement represents between 2.7% and 6.2% of the Settlement Class’s class-
14 wide aggregate damages, which is an extremely favorable result when compared to the
15 median recovery in securities class action settlements with similar aggregate damages.
16 Moreover, the Settlement was reached only after extensive, arm’s-length negotiations
17 conducted by experienced counsel with the assistance of former District Court Judge
18 Layn R. Phillips (“Judge Phillips”), and it is the result of a mediator’s recommendation
19 that followed an all-day mediation session and follow-up negotiations. The Settlement
20 is, therefore, both substantively and procedurally fair, and final approval is appropriate.

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22
23 ¹ Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms have the same meaning set forth
24 in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated March 21, 2025 (“Stipulation”)
25 (ECF No. 89-1). Internal citations and quotations are omitted unless otherwise noted.
26 Citations to “Joint Decl.” are to the Joint Declaration of Joshua Baker and Ex Kano S.
27 Sams II, filed herewith. Citations to “¶__” or “Ex. __” are to the paragraphs and
28 exhibits of the Joint Decl. Citations to “Walter Decl.” are to the Declaration of Adam
D. Walter, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Joint Decl. Citations to “Fee Brief” are to the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion for an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses filed herewith.

1 Plaintiffs also seek approval of the proposed Plan of Allocation (“Plan”). Lead
2 Counsel developed the proposed Plan in consultation with a consulting damages expert.
3 The proposed Plan comports with applicable legal principles and Plaintiffs’ theory of
4 damages, and in no way favors Plaintiffs over other members of the Settlement Class.
5 The Court should approve the Plan because it, too, is fair and reasonable.

6 Finally, Plaintiffs seek final certification of the Settlement Class for settlement
7 purposes. The Court preliminarily certified the Settlement Class in its Preliminary
8 Approval Order, and no pertinent changes have transpired that would upset or alter the
9 Court’s preliminary findings and determinations. Thus, the Court should certify the
10 Settlement Class for settlement purposes.

11 **II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE LITIGATION**

12 For the sake of brevity, the Court is respectfully referred to the Joint Declaration
13 for a discussion of, *inter alia*: the Action’s history; the nature of the claims asserted;
14 the negotiations leading to the Settlement; the risks and uncertainties of continued
15 litigation; a summary of the services Lead Counsel provided for the benefit of the
16 Settlement Class; and additional information on the factors that support final approval
17 of the Settlement and the Plan.

18 **III. CERTIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT CLASS IS WARRANTED**

19 The Court preliminarily certified the Settlement Class for settlement purposes in
20 its Preliminary Approval Order. ECF No. 92 at 2. As detailed in Plaintiffs’ brief in
21 support of preliminary approval of the Settlement, ECF No. 88-1 at 5-10, certification
22 of the Settlement Class under Rule 23 is merited here.

23 The Court thoroughly analyzed each element of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) in the
24 Preliminary Approval Order. ECF No. 92 at 2-4. No pertinent changes have transpired
25 since the Court issued the Preliminary Approval Order that would upset or alter the
26 Court’s findings. Thus, the Court should grant final certification of the Settlement Class
27 for settlement purposes. *See In re Stable Road Acquisition Corp.*, 2024 WL 3643393,
28 at *11 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2024).

1 **IV. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT WARRANTS FINAL APPROVAL**

2 Rule 23 requires judicial approval of class action settlements, and provides that
3 a class action settlement should be approved if the court finds it “fair, reasonable, and
4 adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) . It is within the “sound discretion of the district
5 courts to appraise the reasonableness of [] settlements on a case-by-case basis.” *Evans*
6 *v. Jeff D.*, 475 U.S. 717, 742 (1986). The Ninth Circuit strongly favors settlement
7 “particularly where complex class action litigation is concerned.” *In re Syncor ERISA*
8 *Litig.*, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008); *In re Omnivision Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp.
9 2d 1036, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“the court must also be mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s
10 policy favoring settlement, particularly in class action law suits”).

11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) provides that, to determine if a
12 settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the Court must consider whether:

13 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have
14 adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was
15 negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief provided for the
16 class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and
17 delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any
18 proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including
19 the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the
20 terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including
21 timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be
22 identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats
23 class members equitably relative to each other.

24 These factors do not “displace” any previously adopted factors, but “focus the
25 court and the lawyers on the core concerns of procedure and substance that should
26 guide the decision whether to approve the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) Advisory
27 Committee’s Notes to 2018 Amendment, 324 F.R.D. 904, 918. Ultimately, “[a]
28 settlement should be approved if it is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.”
Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1993); *In re Mego Fin.*
Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). In evaluating whether
settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate, courts in the Ninth Circuit traditionally

1 consider the following factors, some of which overlap with the requirements of Rule
2 23(e)(2): “the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely
3 duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the
4 trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage
5 of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a government
6 participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” *Lane v.*
7 *Facebook, Inc.*, 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*,
8 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). Keeping in mind that “it is the very uncertainty
9 of outcome in litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce
10 consensual settlements,” courts should not convert settlement approval into an inquiry
11 on the merits. *Officers for Just. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. of San Francisco*,
12 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, the Rule 23(e) and Ninth Circuit factors weigh
13 in favor of final approval.

14 **A. The Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case, Including the Risk, Expense,**
15 **Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation, Supports**
16 **Final Approval**

17 The expense, complexity, and possible duration of the litigation are key factors
18 in evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement. *Torrise*, 8 F.3d at 1375–76; *Salazar v.*
19 *Midwest Servicing Grp., Inc.*, 2018 WL 3031503, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2018). Courts
20 favor settlement where the case is “complex and likely to be expensive and lengthy to
21 try” and presents material risks beyond the “inherent risks of litigation.” *Low v. Trump*
22 *Univ., LLC*, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1301 (S.D. Cal. 2017). Securities actions are
23 notoriously complex and their outcomes uncertain. *Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 2018
24 WL 6619983, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018), *aff’d sub nom. Hefler v. Pekoc*, 802 F.
25 App’x 285 (9th Cir. 2020). Lead Counsel and Plaintiffs carefully evaluated the merits
26 of this case in light of the attendant risks before entering into the Settlement.

27 While Plaintiffs believe that their case is strong, they remain cognizant of the
28 substantial risks posed to the Settlement Class in continuing to litigate this action. *See*

1 *In re Heritage Bond Litig.*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“no
2 matter how confident one may be of the outcome of litigation, such confidence is often
3 misplaced”); *see also In re Sumitomo Copper Litig.*, 189 F.R.D. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
4 1999) (discussing several instances where settlement was rejected by a court only to
5 have the class’s ultimate recovery be less than the proposed settlement).

6 **1. Plaintiffs Faced the Risks of Obtaining and Maintaining Class**
7 **Action Status Through Trial**

8 Plaintiffs had not yet undertaken the complex and expensive task of obtaining
9 certification of the putative class. One of the more difficult elements of class
10 certification to satisfy is showing that class-wide issues, such as reliance on
11 Defendants’ misrepresentations, predominate over individualized issues. Pursuant to
12 *Basic Inc. v. Levinson*, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), to show their entitlement to the
13 presumption of class-wide reliance, Plaintiffs would need to prove that Live Nation’s
14 common stock traded in an efficient market throughout the entire Class Period.

15 To satisfy the *Basic* presumption, Plaintiffs would need to hire an expert
16 economist to conduct an event study showing the price reaction of Live Nation stock
17 to new material information, prepare a report, and testify at a deposition on the issue
18 of market efficiency. Such well-qualified experts are expensive. ¶43. Defendants may
19 contest the efficiency of the market, and likely would have raised arguments
20 concerning whether the alleged fraud impacted the stock price. ¶42. Defendants would
21 present their own expert report and testimony to oppose class certification. In addition
22 to briefing the certification motion, Plaintiffs would need to produce documents, sit for
23 depositions, and take the opposing expert’s deposition. ¶43.

24 Even if Plaintiffs obtained class certification, they faced a risk that they would
25 not be able to sustain class certification through judgment. Rule 23(c)(1) provides that
26 a class certification order may be “altered or amended before final judgment,” and thus
27 a class is not safely certified until judgment. *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1041
28 (“there is no guarantee the [class] certification would survive through trial, as

1 Defendants might have sought decertification or modification of the class”). While
2 rare, a change in the law or facts might upset certification. *See Arkansas Tchr. Ret. Sys.*
3 *v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.*, 77 F.4th 74 (2d Cir. 2023) (decertifying a class of
4 investors after 12 years of litigation). Thus, the complexity and cost of class
5 certification proceedings, along with the risk of failing to obtain and maintain
6 certification, supports approval of the Settlement.

7 **2. Plaintiffs Faced Significant Risks to Proving Liability and** 8 **Other Risks of Continued Litigation**

9 Even if Plaintiffs obtained class certification, there is no question that further
10 litigation would be risky, complex, and expensive. Defendants would continue to
11 argue, as they had from the pleading stage, that Plaintiffs must prove complex
12 violations of antitrust law in order to prove the elements of falsity and scienter. ¶30. In
13 any event, Plaintiffs would need to prove that Defendants not only engaged in the
14 alleged anticompetitive conduct, or that Live Nation lacked real competition in its
15 primary markets, but also that they knowingly or recklessly misled investors in their
16 statements. ¶32. Allegations of anticompetitive conduct, or lack of market competition,
17 are tentpoles of antitrust litigation, which is itself notoriously complex. Proving those
18 allegations would require extensive discovery (beyond what Plaintiffs had already
19 undertaken at the time of settlement, including significant additional third-party
20 discovery) and would entail an expensive and extensive “battle of the experts,” where
21 each side would propound expert economic analysis on several different issues,
22 including purported “procompetitive” effects of Live Nation’s conduct and market
23 definition. ¶30.

24 After fact discovery the Parties would engage in expert discovery on the
25 questions of loss causation and damages, as well as antitrust law and economics. On
26 loss causation and damages issues, Defendants would likely present their own expert
27 testimony to demonstrate that the revelation of the fraud did not cause the alleged stock
28 drops, and/or attempt to demonstrate that all or a portion of the alleged stock drops was

1 attributable to other issues unrelated to the alleged fraud. ¶39. All told, expert discovery
2 and trial preparation would prove expensive and complex, with no guarantee of victory.
3 *See Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *6; *see also In re Cendant Corp. Litig.*, 264
4 F.3d 201, 239 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[E]stablishing damages at trial would lead to a battle of
5 experts with each side presenting its figures to the jury and with no guarantee whom
6 the jury would believe.”).

7 Accordingly, Plaintiffs faced the risk that they might lose on summary judgment.
8 *See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 627 F.3d 376, 395 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming
9 summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiff failed to establish a triable
10 issue on loss causation); *In re NeoPharm, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 705 F. Supp. 2d 946, 966
11 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (granting partial summary judgment where plaintiffs failed to prove
12 falsity or scienter). Plaintiffs may have an expert excluded, damaging their case. *See,*
13 *e.g., In re Puda Coal Sec. Inc., Litig.*, 30 F. Supp. 3d 230, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), *aff’d*
14 *sub nom. Querub v. Hong Kong*, 649 F. App'x 55 (2d Cir. 2016).

15 Plaintiffs might also lose at trial, or the jury might reduce damages significantly.
16 *See ISS, Puma Biotechnology – Both Sides Claim Victory in Rare Jury Trial Verdict*
17 (Feb. 15, 2019) (reporting that according to defendants, plaintiffs won only 5% of the
18 damages they requested), [https://www.issgovernance.com/puma-biotechnology-both-](https://www.issgovernance.com/puma-biotechnology-both-sides-claim-victory-in-rare-jury-trial-verdict/)
19 [sides-claim-victory-in-rare-jury-trial-verdict/](https://www.issgovernance.com/puma-biotechnology-both-sides-claim-victory-in-rare-jury-trial-verdict/). Plaintiffs might still lose their case even
20 after winning at trial. *In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc.*, 2011 WL 1585605, at *38 (S.D.
21 Fla. Apr. 25, 2011), *aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp,*
22 *Inc.*, 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012) (granting motion for judgment as a matter of law,
23 reversing plaintiffs’ partial jury verdict for failure to prove loss causation). Even if
24 Plaintiffs were to secure a verdict for damages and defend the verdict from Defendants’
25 inevitable post-trial motions, Plaintiffs might still lose on appeal. *Robbins v. Koger*
26 *Props., Inc.*, 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (overturning \$81 million jury verdict).

27 Accordingly, the likely duration, complexity, and expense of further litigation
28 supports a finding that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. *See Nat’l Rural*

1 *Telecommunications Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
2 (“[U]nless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are
3 preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.”).

4 **B. The Amount Obtained in Settlement Supports Final Approval**

5 What constitutes a reasonable settlement amount “is not susceptible of a
6 mathematical equation yielding a particularized sum.” *In re PaineWebber Ltd.*
7 *Partnerships Litig.*, 171 F.R.D. 104, 130 (S.D.N.Y.), *aff’d sub nom. In re PaineWebber*
8 *Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig.*, 117 F.3d 721 (2d Cir. 1997). Nor is the proposed
9 Settlement “to be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure of what might
10 have been achieved by the negotiators.” *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 625. As
11 “[s]ettlement is the offspring of compromise[,] the question [courts] address is not
12 whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair,
13 adequate and free from collusion.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. Common sense dictates
14 that Plaintiffs must take less in a settlement than they would after a complete trial
15 victory or Defendants would have no reason to settle. In a factually and legally complex
16 securities class action lawsuit such as this, this is no guarantee that Plaintiffs could
17 secure a judgment at or near the full amount of the class-wide damages they estimate.
18 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has found that a settlement may be acceptable even if it
19 amounts to “only a fraction of the potential recovery” that might be available at trial.
20 *Officers for Justice*, 688 F.2d at 628; *Mego*, 213 F.3d at 459.

21 Moreover, estimating aggregate damages can be challenging due to, among other
22 things, assumptions that must be made regarding trading activity. The estimated
23 damages would be reduced or eliminated entirely if the Court or jury were to accept
24 some or all of Defendants’ defenses, including that a portion or all of the losses are
25 attributable to causes other than the alleged misstatements or omissions, or that certain
26 statements are not actionable. ¶39. In arriving at this Settlement, Plaintiffs carefully
27 considered the significant risk that they would be unable to recover a greater amount
28 further down the road.

1 Here, the \$20,000,000 Settlement recovers roughly 2.7% of Plaintiffs’
2 **maximum** estimated class-wide damages of \$743 million under Plaintiffs’ **best-case**
3 **scenario**, as estimated by Plaintiffs’ consulting damages expert. ¶49. This best-case
4 scenario assumes that: (i) Plaintiffs prevail at summary judgment **and** trial; (ii) the
5 Court certifies the same class period as the Settlement Class Period; **and** (iii) the Court
6 **and** jury accept Plaintiffs’ damages theory, including proof of loss causation for the
7 **full amount** of **each** of the **alleged declines** in stock price. *Id.* The percentage of
8 maximum damages recovered here falls well within the range of other securities class
9 action settlements. *See In re Regulus Therapeutics Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2020 WL 6381898,
10 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020) (approving 1.99% recovery); *Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL
11 1594403, at *8-9 (average recovery between 2% to 3% of maximum damages); *In re*
12 *Giant Interactive Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 279 F.R.D. 151, 162–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“the
13 average settlement in securities class actions ranges from 3% to 7% of the class’s total
14 estimated losses”). It is also substantially higher than the median recovery of 1.7% in
15 similarly sized securities cases. *See* Ex. 6 (excerpts from Edward Flores and Svetlana
16 Starykh, *Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2024 Full-Year Review*
17 (NERA Jan. 22, 2025) (“NERA Report”), at 26 (Fig. 23) (between 2015 and 2024, the
18 median recovery for settlements of securities class actions with estimated damages
19 between \$600-\$999 million was 1.7% of investor losses)).

20 Furthermore, if the Court or the jury did not find loss causation as to the alleged
21 stock price declines on February 24, 2023, July 28, 2023, and November 21, 2023, the
22 dates as to which Defendants were likely to raise substantial loss causation arguments,
23 Lead Counsel estimates that recoverable damages for the two remaining corrective
24 disclosures (November 18, 2022 and May 23, 2024) would be approximately \$320.8
25 million. ¶52. In this scenario, the \$20 million Settlement Amount would represent
26 approximately 6.2% of recoverable damages, *id.*, which is more than double the median
27 recovery in securities cases with similar damages. Ex. 6 (NERA Report), at 26 (Fig.
28 23) (between 2015 and 2024, the median recovery for settlements of securities class

1 actions with estimated damages between \$200-\$399 million was 2.9% of investor
2 losses).

3 Thus, the amount of the Settlement supports a finding that it is a reasonable and
4 adequate result for the Settlement Class.

5 **C. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the**
6 **Proceedings Support Final Approval**

7 Courts also consider the stage of the proceedings and the amount of information
8 available to the parties to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their case in
9 determining the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a settlement. *Mego*, 213 F.3d
10 at 458. In considering a class action settlement, courts look for indications that the
11 parties carefully investigated the claims before reaching a resolution. *In re:*
12 *Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 2016 WL
13 6248426, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (extensive discovery is “not a necessary
14 ticket to the bargaining table where the parties have sufficient information to make an
15 informed decision about settlement”).

16 Lead Counsel conducted an extensive investigation of the claims asserted in this
17 Action, including: (i) reviewing Live Nation’s SEC filings, press releases, conference
18 calls, and other public statements during the putative class period; (ii) reviewing
19 public documents, reports, announcements, and news articles concerning Live Nation,
20 including research reports by securities and financial analysts and the DOJ’s
21 complaint; and (iii) retaining an investigator to interview former Live Nation
22 employees and knowledgeable third parties. ¶13. Lead Counsel also fully briefed and
23 prevailed against Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ¶¶15-16, and reviewed nearly
24 200,000 pages of documents produced in discovery by Defendants and key third
25 parties. ¶¶19-21.

26 Lead Counsel’s efforts allowed them to make an informed assessment of the
27 strengths and weaknesses of this Action, essential to recommending to Plaintiffs
28 whether to accept the Settlement Amount to resolve the Action. Reviewing

1 Defendants' mediation statement and negotiating the Settlement during and after the
2 mediation in conjunction with a former District Court Judge further informed Lead
3 Counsel about the strengths and weaknesses of the case. ¶23. As a result, Plaintiffs and
4 Lead Counsel had an ample understanding of the merits and weaknesses of this Action
5 and the reasonableness of the Settlement. Courts regularly find this factor supports
6 approval of a settlement even when plaintiffs settle before any discovery. *See, e.g.,*
7 *Mego*, 213 F.3d at 459 (finding that even absent extensive formal discovery, class
8 counsel's significant investigation and research supported settlement approval). Courts
9 have commended class counsel for recognizing when, as was the case here, a prompt
10 resolution of the matter is in the best interest of the class. *See Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs.,*
11 *Inc.*, 2007 WL 221862, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) ("Class counsel achieved an
12 excellent result for the class members by settling the instant action promptly"), *aff'd*,
13 331 F. Appx. 452, 457 (9th Cir. 2009).

14 Here, at the time of Settlement, Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel had acquired
15 "fulsome understandings" of the parties' respective positions on the legal and factual
16 issues in the case. *In re Zynga Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2015 WL 6471171, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
17 27, 2015). Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel were sufficiently informed at this stage of the
18 litigation to negotiate a reasonable Settlement, supporting final approval. *See id.* ("The
19 use of a mediator and the presence of discovery support the conclusion that the Plaintiff
20 was appropriately informed in negotiating a settlement.")

21 **D. The Proposed Settlement Resulted from Good Faith Arm's-Length**
22 **Negotiations by Informed, Experienced Counsel**

23 "The Ninth Circuit, as well as courts in this District, 'put a good deal of stock in
24 the product of an arms-length, non-collusive, negotiated resolution' in approving a
25 class action settlement." *Stable Road*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *6 (quoting *Rodriguez v.*
26 *W. Publ'g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)). Here, Plaintiffs reached the
27 Settlement after arm's-length negotiations facilitated by a nationally renowned
28 mediator with extensive experience mediating securities class actions, Judge Phillips.

1 “The assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement process confirms that the
2 settlement is non-collusive.” *Satchell v. Fed. Express Corp.*, 2007 WL 1114010, at *4
3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007). Judge Phillips has considerable experience mediating
4 complex, securities class actions. ¶22; Ex. 9. With Judge Phillips’ guidance, the Parties
5 were eventually able to come to terms after continuing negotiations for weeks
6 following a full-day mediation session. ¶23. “The fact ... that the Settlement is based
7 on a mediator’s proposal further supports a finding that the settlement agreement is not
8 the product of collusion.” *Lusk v. Five Guys Enterprises LLC*, 2022 WL 4791923, at
9 *9 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2022); *Roberti v. OSI Sys., Inc.*, 2015 WL 8329916, at *3 (C.D.
10 Cal. Dec. 8, 2015) (that the parties accepted a mediator’s proposal from Judge Phillips
11 after participating in a full-day mediation and continuing negotiations over the ensuing
12 weeks confirmed that the settlement was non-collusive).

13 In addition to the non-collusive, vigorous settlement negotiations, counsel on
14 both sides of this Action are experienced and knowledgeable when it comes to litigating
15 complex, securities class actions. “Parties represented by competent counsel are better
16 positioned than courts to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected
17 outcome in litigation.” *In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.*, 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995);
18 *Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *9 (in a complex class action, counsel is “most
19 closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation”). “Absent fraud,
20 collusion, or the like,” the Court should give “[g]reat weight [] to the recommendation
21 of counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation,”
22 *Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL 1594403, at *9; *DIRECTV*, 221 F.R.D. at 528.

23 Co-Lead Counsel’s respective experience and reputations allowed them to
24 leverage the credible threat of further litigation and trial, but also to recognize that the
25 Settlement was a better option for the Settlement Class. Courts in this District, as well
26 as others, have recognized that Rosen Law and GPM are each knowledgeable and
27 experienced firms well-suited to serve as class counsel in securities class actions such
28 as this one. *Knox v. Yingli Green Energy Holding Co. Ltd.*, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1165

1 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“The Rosen Law Firm is highly qualified [and] experienced in
2 securities class actions[.]”); *Stable Road*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *13 (“GPM’s attorneys
3 have many years of experience litigating complex federal civil cases, and, in particular,
4 shareholder and securities class actions.”). The experience of Plaintiffs’ counsel thus
5 supports approval of the Settlement they negotiated. Likewise, counsel for Defendants,
6 Latham & Watkins LLP, vigorously represented their client and were at least equally
7 informed about the merits of the case. ¶85.

8 Finally, Plaintiffs’ support for the Settlement is further evidence that the
9 Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. *See* Exs. 1-2 (Plaintiffs’ declarations).
10 Plaintiffs’ support for a settlement should be accorded “special weight because [the
11 plaintiff] may have a better understanding of the case than most members of the class.”
12 *DIRECTV*, 221 F.R.D. at 528 (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.44
13 (1995)). The extensive arms’ length negotiations and the support of both experienced
14 counsel and Plaintiffs favors final approval of the Settlement.

15 **E. The Presence of a Governmental Participant Does Not Weigh Against**
16 **Approval**

17 Courts in the Ninth Circuit also consider the presence of a governmental
18 participant in weighing approval of a proposed class action settlement. Here, although
19 there was an ongoing investigation and action by the DOJ, at the outset of the instant
20 Action the DOJ had not filed its complaint, and at the time the Settlement was reached
21 the DOJ’s complaint had not yet survived Live Nation’s motion to dismiss. ¶47. The
22 DOJ’s still-pending antitrust case does not stand to provide a direct financial benefit to
23 investors in Live Nation stock, as this Settlement does. ¶48. Nor did the DOJ case
24 materially decrease the risks of Plaintiffs prevailing here, as this case was procedurally
25 ahead of the DOJ case and likely would have reached summary judgment stage well
26 before any resolution or findings of fact were made in the DOJ case. *Id.* Indeed, if the
27 DOJ case were dismissed or withdrawn, or if exculpatory evidence came to light in that
28 case, Plaintiffs’ case here would have been substantially weakened. *Id.* Notably,

1 Plaintiffs did not have access to the fruits of the years-long DOJ investigation and had
2 to build their case independently. *Id.* Thus, the existence of the DOJ investigation and
3 then-nascent action “does not support a finding that [Plaintiffs] could have achieved a
4 better outcome than the \$[20] million recovery obtained here. Accordingly, this factor
5 weighs minimally, if at all, against denying the Approval Motion, and does not prevent
6 final settlement approval.” *Abadilla v. Precigen, Inc.*, 2023 WL 7305053, at *11 (N.D.
7 Cal. Nov. 6, 2023); *see also In re Wells Fargo Collateral Prot. Ins. Litig.*, 2019 WL
8 6219875, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2019) (approving final settlement where government
9 investigated practices at issue in litigation prior to filing of suit was “[p]erhaps the only
10 *Churchill* factor weighing against approving the settlement”).

11 **F. The Favorable Reaction of the Settlement Class Supports Approval**

12 To date, 207,586 potential Settlement Class Members were directly notified of
13 the Settlement either by mailed Postcard Notice or by emailed link to the Notice and
14 Proof of Claim. Walter Decl. ¶10. The Claims Administrator, A.B. Data, caused
15 106,270 copies of the Postcard Notice to be mailed to potential Settlement Class
16 Members, and 101,316 potential Settlement Class Members received emails with links
17 to the Notice and Claim Form. *Id.* The deadline to file objections to, or request
18 exclusion from, the Settlement is August 7, 2025. To date, no Settlement Class
19 Members have objected to the Settlement, and only one deficient request for exclusion
20 has been received. *Id.* ¶¶17-18; Joint Decl. ¶¶65-66. Plaintiffs will respond to
21 subsequent objections, if any, in their reply.

22 The absence of objections to a proposed class action settlement supports
23 approval. *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1043; *In re Rambus Inc. Derivative Litig.*,
24 2009 WL 166689, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009) (“the absence of a large number of
25 objections to a proposed class action settlement raises a strong presumption that the
26 terms of a proposed class settlement action are favorable to the class members”). That
27 no valid requests for exclusion (and only one deficient request) have been received also
28 supports the Settlement’s approval. *See Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec.*, 361 F.3d

1 566, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming settlement with 0.56% of eligible class members
2 requesting exclusion); *Maine State Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp.*, 2013 WL
3 6577020, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013) (69 exclusion requests in response to mailing
4 of over 50,000 notices supports settlement).

5 “[T]he fact that the overwhelming majority of the class willingly approved the
6 offer and stayed in the class presents at least some objective positive commentary as to
7 its fairness.” *Hanlon*, 150 F.3d at 1027. The absence of any objections or valid
8 exclusion requests here supports final approval of the Settlement.

9 **G. The Settlement Meets the Remaining Rule 23(e)(2) Factors**

10 **1. The Proposed Method for Distributing Relief Is Effective**

11 Rule 23 requires that the Court consider the effectiveness of the proposed
12 method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing claims.
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(ii). The Preliminary Approval Order established a plan to
14 provide notice to potential Settlement Class Members, which Plaintiffs and the Claims
15 Administrator duly executed. As the Court directed in the Preliminary Approval Order,
16 A.B. Data mailed copies of the Postcard Notice and emailed links to the Notice and
17 Proof of Claim to over 200,000 potential Settlement Class Members and published the
18 Summary Notice on *PR Newswire* and in *Investor’s Business Daily*. Walter Decl. ¶¶2-
19 11. The Postcard Notice and emails notified Settlement Class Members of the
20 Settlement and directed them to the Settlement website (a case-specific website) where
21 the Claims Administrator posted key documents including the Stipulation, Notice,
22 Proof of Claim, and Preliminary Approval Order. *Id.* ¶13.

23 Settlement Class Members are to complete a standard Proof of Claim form that
24 requests the information necessary to calculate claims pursuant to the Plan. The case-
25 specific website also allowed Settlement Class Members to file their claims
26 electronically. Walter Decl. ¶14. “Claims processing, like the method proposed here,
27 is standard in securities class action settlements. It has been long found to be effective,
28 as well as necessary, insofar as neither Lead Plaintiff nor Defendants possess the

1 individual investor trading data required for a claims-free process to distribute the Net
2 Settlement Fund.” *Stable Road*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *7.

3 **2. The Proposed Award of Attorneys’ Fees is Appropriate**

4 Rule 23 also addresses “the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees,
5 including timing of payment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii). As discussed in the Fee
6 Brief, Lead Counsel seek an award of attorneys’ fees of 30% of the Settlement Amount,
7 plus interest, and reimbursement of Litigation Expenses of \$142,613.30. This fee
8 request, below the maximum disclosed in the Notice, is consistent with awards granted
9 in similar actions in the Ninth Circuit. *See* Fee Brief, §III(C)(5).

10 Included in the request for reimbursement of Litigation Expenses are awards to
11 Plaintiffs of \$12,500 total pursuant to the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4), in
12 connection with their representation of the Settlement Class. Plaintiffs supervised and
13 engaged with Lead Counsel during litigation and throughout settlement negotiations,
14 and kept abreast of developments in this case and with Live Nation generally. Plaintiffs
15 spent their own valuable time representing the Settlement Class. Exs. 1-2 (Plaintiffs’
16 declarations). Plaintiffs’ request for compensation is appropriate, as courts regularly
17 grant similar awards to representative plaintiffs. *See* Fee Brief, §V.

18 **3. The Parties Have No Other Agreements Besides Opt-Outs**

19 Rule 23 requires that any agreement made in connection with the proposed
20 Settlement be disclosed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv). As previously disclosed in the
21 Stipulation (¶37) and in Plaintiffs’ brief in support of preliminary approval (ECF No.
22 88-1 at 17), the Parties entered into a Supplemental Agreement that gives Live Nation
23 the right to terminate the Settlement if Settlement Class Members holding more than a
24 certain number of shares request exclusion. Only the agreement’s exact terms—
25 specifically, the number of shares that trigger the right to terminate—has not been
26 disclosed to Settlement Class Members. This Supplemental Agreement poses no
27 obstacle to final approval of the Settlement. *Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu*,
28 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006); *Hefler v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, 2018 WL 4207245,

1 at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2018) (“a termination option triggered by the number of class
2 members who opt out of the Settlement does not by itself render the Settlement
3 unfair.”). Live Nation has not, to date, exercised its termination option.

4 **4. There is No Preferential Treatment; the Proposed Plan of**
5 **Allocation Treats Settlement Class Members Equitably**

6 Rule 23 requires courts to evaluate whether the settlement treats class members
7 equitably relative to one another. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). The Plan determines how
8 the money is distributed to Authorized Claimants. The Net Settlement Fund is
9 distributed *pro rata* to each Settlement Class Member who submits a valid claim based
10 on their recognized losses resulting from their purchases of Live Nation stock during
11 the Settlement Class Period and the subsequent stock price decline upon revelation of
12 the truth, as alleged in the SAC. ¶¶68-70. Lead Counsel developed the Plan in
13 consultation with Plaintiffs’ consulting damages expert, and the Plan closely tracks the
14 theory of the case. ¶¶68-69. The Plan will determine Plaintiffs’ recovery just like every
15 other Settlement Class Member, so Plaintiffs receive no preferential treatment. *Stable*
16 *Road*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *8 (substantially similar plan of allocation treats class
17 members equitably).

18 **V. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION**

19 In the Preliminary Approval Order, the Court preliminarily approved the Plan,
20 which was detailed in the Notice. Plaintiffs now request that the Court grant final
21 approval of the Plan for the purpose of administering the Settlement. Courts assess
22 plans of allocation by the same metric as settlements as a whole: they must be “fair,
23 reasonable and adequate.” *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. Practically speaking,
24 “[a]n allocation formula need only have a reasonable, rational basis, particularly if
25 recommended by experienced and competent class counsel.” *In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec.*
26 *Litig.*, 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

27 The proposed Plan has a reasonable, rational basis. It distributes the settlement
28 proceeds on a *pro rata* basis, calculating a claimant’s relative loss proximately caused

1 by Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and omissions, based on factors such as
2 when and at what prices the claimant purchased and sold Live Nation stock. Plaintiffs
3 engaged a damages consultant to assist in developing the Plan to allocate the Settlement
4 proceeds among Claimants with the goal of reimbursing Settlement Class Members in
5 a fair and reasonable manner. ¶¶68-74.

6 Because they tend to mirror the complaint’s allegations in securities class
7 actions, “plans that allocate money depending on the timing of purchases and sales of
8 the securities at issue are common.” *In re Datatec Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2007 WL
9 4225828, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2007); *see also In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig.*, 209
10 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding plan of allocation was “even handed”
11 where “claimants are to be reimbursed on a *pro rata* basis for their recognized losses
12 based largely on when they bought and sold their shares”). Here, each authorized
13 claimant will receive a *pro rata* share of the Net Settlement Fund based on the
14 claimant’s recognized loss as calculated in accordance with the Plan. ¶70. There have
15 been no objections to the Plan from any potential Settlement Class Members. Walter
16 Decl. ¶18; Joint Decl. ¶75. The Plan fairly compensates Settlement Class Members and
17 should be approved. *See Stable Road*, 2024 WL 3643393, at *10-11 (approving
18 substantially similar plan of allocation).

19 **VI. NOTICE TO THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SATISFIED DUE PROCESS**

20 Plaintiffs provided the Settlement Class with adequate notice of the Settlement,
21 in the manner and form that the Court preliminarily approved. 207,586 potential
22 Settlement Class Members received direct notice about the Settlement. Walter Decl.,
23 ¶10. Of those, there were 106,270 Postcard Notices mailed and 101,316 emails sent
24 with links to the Notice and Proof of Claim. *Id.* The Claims Administrator also
25 published the Court-approved Summary Notice online in *PR Newswire* and in print in
26 *Investor’s Business Daily*. *Id.* ¶11. The Claims Administrator also published all
27 required information regarding the Settlement online on the Settlement Website. *Id.*
28 ¶13. The notice plan executed here directed notice in a “reasonable manner to all class

1 members who would be bound by the propos[ed judgment].” Fed. R. Civ. P.
2 23(e)(1)(B).

3 The Notice provides all necessary information for Settlement Class Members to
4 make an informed decision regarding the proposed Settlement. *See* Walter Decl., Ex.
5 B (Notice). It “generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to
6 alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.”
7 *Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2009). The Notice gave
8 Settlement Class Members all the information they needed to decide whether to opt
9 out, object, or file a claim. It told Settlement Class Members, among other things: (1)
10 the amount of the Settlement; (2) why the parties propose the Settlement; (3) the
11 estimated average recovery per damaged share; (4) the maximum amount of attorneys’
12 fees and expenses that Lead Counsel would seek; (5) Lead Counsel’s contact
13 information; (6) that Settlement Class Members could object to the Settlement or
14 exclude themselves from the Settlement Class, and the consequences thereof; and (7)
15 the dates and deadlines for certain Settlement-related events. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7).
16 The Notice further explained that the Net Settlement Fund would be distributed to
17 eligible Settlement Class Members who submit valid and timely claim forms under the
18 Plan as described in the Notice.

19 In sum, the Notice fairly apprised Settlement Class Members of their rights, is
20 the best notice practicable under the circumstances, and complies with the Court’s
21 Preliminary Approval Order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the PSLRA, and due
22 process. Courts routinely find these methods of notice sufficient. “The use of a
23 combination of a mailed post card directing class members to a more detailed online
24 notice has been approved by courts.” *In re Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig.*,
25 298 F.R.D. 171, 183 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases); *Baker v. SeaWorld Ent.,*
26 *Inc.*, 2020 WL 818893, at *2-*3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2020) (approving similar notice
27 program). Defendants will also provide notice to appropriate governmental officials
28 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1715 *et seq.*; Stipulation ¶60.

1 **VII. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' motions and: (a)
3 certify the Settlement Class; (b) approve the Settlement and Plan as fair, reasonable,
4 and adequate; and (c) find that the notice plan complied with all applicable
5 requirements.

6
7 Respectfully submitted,

8 Dated: July 24, 2025

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9
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH L.R. 11-6.2

The undersigned, counsel of record for Plaintiffs, certifies that this brief contains 6,578 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

Date: July 24, 2025

/s/ Joshua Baker
Joshua Baker